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Abstract: This paper presents a large-scale empirical analysis of interest group influence 
on EU policy-making across a wide range of issues. The explanation of policy outcomes 
as well as the democratic legitimacy of the EU crucially depends on how much influence 
interest groups have and how influence is distributed among them. However, only few 
studies have addressed the question of influence and most are limited to case studies 
focusing only on one single issue. Recent literature however suggests that interest group 
influence varies considerably across issues. It is assumed that influence is not a mere 
function of interest group characteristics, but strongly shaped by the issue context. The 
lack of large-N studies controling for issue variables is mainly due to methodological 
difficulties in measuring influence. Hence, this paper employs a new approach: Drawing 
on a quantitative text analysis performed with Wordfish, policy preferences of interest 
groups will be compared with the policy proposal in order to identify the winners and the 
losers of the decision-making process. While controling for interest group characteristics, 
the effect of issue-related variables on interest group influence will be tested across 15 
policy issues. 
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1.  Introduction
1
How  much influence do interest groups have on policy-making and how is influence distributed 
among them? These questions should be of central concern to scholars of European politics since the 
explanation of policy outcomes as well as the democratic legitimacy of the European Union crucially 
depend on interest group influence and the distribution of influence among groups. Whereas scholars 
of EU policy-making have mostly concentrated on explaining policy outcomes with reference to the 
formal institutions, the role of interest group has long been ignored (for recent exceptions, see Dür/de 
Bièvre 2007a, Mahoney 2008, Michalowitz 2007). However, if we explain policy outcomes solely 
drawing on preferences and bargaining power of the three major European institutions, we disregard 
how the preferences of these institutions have actually come about. Moravcsik (1993, 1998)  for 
instance argues that member states in the Council function as a transmission belt for interest group 
preferences dominant on the domestic level. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) furthermore argue that 
interest groups also spill over to the European level and have an important direct impact on policy-
making at the European level. Accordingly, the number of interest groups lobbying the European 
institutions has increased significantly over the past decades (Greenwood 2007: 12). According to the 
register of the European Parliament, 1954  interest groups are currently active on the European level 
(Berkhout/Lowery 2008: 497). Thus, ignoring the increasing pressure of interest groups in empirical 
research of EU policy-making constitutes an oversimplification of the decision-making process in the 
European Union.  
 
 
In recent years, scholars have therefore started to study interest group influence in the European Union 
(Bernhagen/Bräuninger 2005, Dür/de Bièvre 2007a, Mahoney 2008, Michalowitz 2007, 
Schneider/Baltz 2005, Woll 2007). Two main groups of explanatory variables have been identified: 
interest group properties (e.g. interest group type, organizational form) and issue characteristics (e.g. 
salience, complexity of policy proposal, location of the status quo and size of lobbying perspective) 
(Dür/de Bièvre 2007b).
2
The majority of interest group studies draws on interest group properties as the main explanatory 
variables for variation in interest group influence (e.g. Dür/de Bièvre 2007a, Schneider/Baltz 2003). 
Among interest group properties, interest group type has been identified as a major explanatory 
variable for interest group influence. Concerning group type, one can basically distinguish two 
dimensions: Nature of the interest (cause vs. sectional groups) and organizational form (companies, 
  
 
                                                           
1  I thank Berthold Rittberger,  Thomas Gschwend, Christine Mahoney and  Andrea Haupt  for valuable  comments and 
suggestions. 
2 A third factor shaping interest group influence are institutional characteristics of the political system (Mahoney 2004, 
2007). Whereas this variable could account for variation in interest group influence across different political systems, it 
cannot explain variation in interest group influence in the European Union since it is held constant. 2 
 
European Associations or National Associations). Drawing on Mancur Olson’s (1965) seminal work 
on the logic of collective action, the most prominent hypothesis is that interest group influence varies 
according to the nature of the interest (e.g. Dür/de Bièvre 2007a, Persson 2007, Schneider/Baltz 2003). 
Diffuse interests should find it more difficult to influence policy outcomes than concentrated interests 
since they are less well endowed with resources. However, this hypothesis has only recently been 
tested mainly drawing on cases studies focusing on one or just a few policy sectors or issues. These 
studies are characterized by contradictory findings: Whereas some studies confirm the hypothesis that 
diffuse interests are less influential than concentrated interests (e.g. Dür/de Bièvre 2007a, 
Schneider/Baltz 2003), other authors contend that diffuse interests were in fact capable of exerting a 
considerable amount of influence on policy-making  (e.g. Pollack 1997, Warleigh 2000). Another 
hypothesis put forward by Pieter Bouwen (2002, 2004) is that the organizational form plays a crucial 
role for being able to influence the decision-making process. According to Bouwen (2002, 2004), 
companies are more powerful than European and National Associations in influencing the policy-
making process since they are better able to provide access goods to decision-makers. However, 
Bouwen’s analysis is limited to business interests in the financial sector and thus his hypotheses need 
to be tested for other policy sectors. 
 
In recent years, scholars have furthermore pointed out the importance of issue related factors for 
interest group influence (e.g. Baumgartner et al. forthcoming, Mahoney 2007, 2008). According to the 
characteristics of the policy issue at hand, interest groups influence is assumed to vary across issues. 
However, since most of the few studies on interest group influence in the EU actually concentrate on 
one or just a few policy issues, the effect of issue related variables cannot be empirically tested since 
the issue context is held constant (for an exception, see Mahoney 2008). 
 
Thus, what is needed is a large-N cross-issue study in order to empirically test the effect of actor type 
and issue-related factors on interest group influence. The lack of large-N cross-issue studies controling 
for issue related variables is mainly due to methodological difficulties in measuring influence (see also 
Dür/de Bièvre 2007a: 2). Hence, this paper suggests a new approach: Drawing on quantitative text 
analysis performed with Wordfish (Proksch/Slapin 2008, Slapin/Proksch 2008), policy preferences of 
interest groups will be compared with the policy output in order to identify the winners and the losers 
of the decision-making process.
3
                                                           
3 As outlined in more detail in the research design section, policy output refers to the final policy proposal since this paper 
focuses specifically on interest group influence during the policy formulation phase. 
 While controling for interest group type, the effect of issue-related 
variables on interest group influence will be tested across 15 policy issues. The present version of the 
paper presents preliminary results stemming from a larger research project. After completion of the 
entire data collection, the analysis will be extended to 59 issues and approximately 3500 observations. 3 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next  section sets out the theoretical framework focusing on 
interest group type and issue characteristics. The third section illustrates the research design followed 
by the empirical analysis in part four.  
 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Interest group type 
Interest group research has put a lot of emphasis on the effect of group type on influence on policy-
making process. One can basically distinguish two streams of research: One referring to the nature of 
the interest and the other one referring to the organizational form of the interest group. 
 
Nature of the interest 
A prominent hypothesis in interest group research is that interest group influence varies according to 
the nature of the interest. However, researchers employ varying definitions to capture the difference in 
the nature of the interest and hence formulate hypotheses such as public interest groups are more 
influential than private interest groups or specific interest groups are more influential than diffuse 
interest groups. Before turning to discussing hypotheses concerning the effect of the nature of the 
interest on interest group influence, it is therefore important to define the meaning of the term “interest 
group” and to give precise definitions of the varying group types related to the nature of the interest. 
This study uses the conventional term “interest group” but employs a very broad definition in order to 
cover a large range of actors. According to Beyers et al. (2008: 1106f) three features must be given: 
organization, political interests, and informality. Organization relates to the nature of the group and 
excludes unorganized broad movements and waves of public opinion. Political interest  refers to 
attempts of these organizations to influence policy outcomes. Informality  relates to the fact that 
interest groups do normally not seek public office or compete in elections but pursue their goals 
through frequent informal interactions with politicians and bureaucrats.  
 
The first distinction to make is between membership organizations and companies. Companies are 
corporate actors whereas membership organizations  have  natural or legal persons as members. 
Concerning membership organizations, it is important to furthermore distinguish according to the 
nature of the interest. Stewart (1958: 25)  differentiated between “sectional groups” and “cause 
groups”. Sectional groups represent a section of society such as farmers or chemical corporations. 
Their task is to look after the specific interest of this particular section of society and their membership 
is usually limited to that section. The common interest of their members is specific and usually of 
primary material nature. Cause groups by contrast represent some belief or principle such as 
environmental protection, health  or consumer protection. The membership of cause groups is not 4 
 
restricted; anyone in favor of the principle can become a member of this group. The common interest 
of cause group members is usually diffuse and of secondary nature.  
 
A prominent hypothesis in interest group research is that cause groups  are less influential than 
sectional groups. It is hypothesized that cause groups are less influential since they cannot provide 
resources  to decision-makers  (Dür/de Bièvre 2007a: 81).
4
Another stream of research is concerned with the effect of organizational form on interest group 
influence. Pieter Bouwen (2002, 2004) presented a well-elaborated theoretical framework explaining 
influence of business associations in the European Union.
  Resources are defined as money, 
information as well as electoral support. With little to exchange, cause groups are not able to shift the 
policy position of decision-makers towards their ideal point. The inability to provide resources lies in 
the nature of the interest they represent: Since cause groups defend some diffuse ideal or principle, 
everyone can join these groups and thus the membership is very heterogenous. Due to the fact that the 
interest is of secondary nature to members and members face only diffuse costs and benefits associated 
with this interest, they will not provide the same financial resources and electoral support as members 
of sectional groups whose primary material interests are affected. Since cause groups defend a diffuse 
ideal or principle and since they lack financial resources they can only provide decision-makers with 
much less detailed information than sectional groups. Thus, even though cause groups have overcome 
the problem of getting organized, they constantly suffer from collective action problems, leading to an 
undersupply of resources (Dür/de Bièvre 2007a: 82). Sectional groups by contrast represent well-
defined  homogenous  constituencies with specific interests. Since these interests are of primary 
material concern to their members they are willing to supply the interest group with the necessary 
financial and electoral support. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Sectional groups are more influential than cause groups. 
 
 
Organizational form 
5
                                                           
4 Dür and de Bièvre limited their own analysis to business associations and companies versus cause groups. Since the 
empirical results however do not differ no matter whether business interests or sectional groups in general are taken into 
account, this paper concentrates on sectional groups. 
5 Bouwen uses access to decision-makers as a proxy for business group influence. Since the empirical results do not differ no 
matter whether only business groups or all types of interest groups are taken into account, the theoretical framework will be 
extended to interest groups in general. 
 Drawing on resource dependency theory, 
Bouwen considers lobbying as an exchange process whereby goods are exchanged between public 
decision-makers and private interest groups. They are interdependent because they are not internally 
self-sufficient but require resources from each other. The resource  required  by interest groups is 
influence on the policy-making process. In return for influence, the European institutions demand 5 
 
certain access goods which are crucial for their functioning. Bouwen (2002, 2004) distinguishes three 
types of access goods: Expert knowledge, information about the European encompassing interest and 
information about the domestic encompassing interest. Expert knowledge refers to expertise and 
technical know-how.  The European encompassing interest refers to the aggregated needs and 
preferences of a specific subset of society at the European level whereas the domestic encompassing 
interest refers to the aggregated needs and preferences of a specific subset of society at the national 
level. The more actors are involved in the formulation of the interest, the more encompassing is the 
interest.  
 
Interest groups can only influence the policy-making process if they are able to provide the access 
goods demanded by the European institutions.
6
Not all interest groups are equally able to supply the demanded access goods. Hence, variation in 
interest group influence is the result of a varying ability to provide the  goods demanded by the 
European Commission. Bouwen (2002, 2004) considers the organizational form of interest groups to 
be the crucial explanatory variable  for the supply of access goods and thus the ability to exert 
influence. According to Bouwen, companies have enough resources to act individually at the national 
 According to Bouwen (2002, 2004), the Commission 
most importantly needs expert knowledge, then information about the European encompassing 
interest, and then information about the domestic encompassing interest. The European Commission 
plays a crucial role in European policy-making since it has the sole right of initiative in the first pillar. 
Only the Commission is able to initiate legislation and is thus responsible for the elaboration of policy 
proposals. Drafting legislative proposals is a highly complex and lengthy process in which the 
Commission  needs  a considerable amount of expertise. Since the Commission is notoriously 
understaffed, it is highly dependent on external expert knowledge to draft policy proposals. Thus, the 
most important access good which the Commission demands from interest groups is  expert 
knowledge. Only interest groups who can supply the necessary expert knowledge are able to exert 
influence on policy formulation. In order to draft successful proposals that are able to win a majority 
in the further decision-making process, the European Commission  furthermore  needs information 
about common European interests. Only if the Commission has an idea about what constitutes the 
common denominator at the European level, it is able to draft a policy proposal that will be accepted 
by Member States in the course of the policy cycle. Thus, the second access good which the 
Commission demands is information about the European encompassing interest. According to Bouwen 
(2002, 2004), information about the domestic encompassing interest is only of minor interest to the 
Commission. 
 
                                                           
6 According to Bouwen (2002, 2004), the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament require each access good to 
a varying degree. Since this analysis concentrates on interest group influence on policy proposals elaborated by the European 
Commission, only the Commission’s demands will be further explained. 6 
 
and the European level. Since they are directly active in the market and dispose of high financial and 
personnel resources they are particularly good at providing technical expert knowledge. Their 
hierarchical internal decision-making structure furthermore  enables them to quickly provide this 
access good to the Commission. European Associations are not as good as companies in providing 
expert knowledge since they have fewer financial and personnel resources and since they represent not 
only the interest of one single corporate actor but of numerous members. Due to their multi-layered 
structure, they additionally cannot respond as quickly as companies to demands from the Commission. 
However, European Associations are particularly good in providing information about the European 
encompassing interest since they manage to aggregate very diverse interests and to produce a 
consensus among them. Thus, they can easily provide information about common European interests. 
National Associations by contrast provide high quality information about the domestic encompassing 
interest but are not very good at providing expert knowledge or information about the European 
encompassing interest.  
 
From the theoretical assumptions concerning the Commission’s demands for access goods and the 
supply of access goods by companies, European and National Associations, the following hypothesis 
can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Companies exert more influence on policy formulation than European Associations  
which in turn are more influential than National Associations. 
 
 
2.2. Theorizing the effect of the issue-context 
Recent literature suggests that interest group influence varies considerably from one issue to another. 
It is assumed that influence is not a mere function of interest group characteristics, but strongly shaped 
by the issue context. The issue is the decision at stake. Particularly the following dimensions of the 
issue context are assumed to play a decisive role: The salience of an issue, the complexity of issues, 
the size of the lobbying perspectives and the location of the status quo. 
 
Salience  is the importance of issues to interest groups.  Policy issues raise a varying amount of 
attention. Some issues are only of interest to a highly specialized and well-circumscribed sector. 
However, other policy issues may raise an enormous amount of attention among interest groups and 
even among the public. If policy issues are not very salient, interest groups trying to influence policy-
making should find it rather easy to do so since they do not have many competitors who could push 
the decision-makers into another direction. However, if policy issues are highly salient and many 
interest groups are actively trying to shift the policy outcome towards their ideal point, interest groups 7 
 
should find it difficult to exert influence since policy-makers cannot listen to one single advocate 
(Mahoney 2007, 2008).
 7
                                                           
7 Being aware that issue salience can also be triggered by interest group activity, this analysis conceptualizes salience as an 
exogenous variable. However, in order to control for interest group strategies that aim at deliberately increasing the salience 
of an issue, interest groups will be questioned about outside lobbying strategies (e.g. demonstrations, protests) in the 
questionnaire.  
 Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   The higher the issue salience, the lower the chance that an interest group can exert 
influence on policy-making. 
 
Another hypothesis is that interest group influence varies according to the complexity of policy issues 
(Dür 2008a: 1217). The European Commission plays a crucial role in European policy-making since it 
has the sole right of initiative in the first pillar. Only the Commission is able to initiate legislation and 
is thus responsible for the elaboration of policy proposals. Drafting legislative proposals is a highly 
complex and lengthy process in which the Commission needs a considerable amount of expertise. 
Since the Commission is notoriously understaffed (Marks/McAdam 1999: 105, McLaughlin et al. 
1993: 201),  it is highly dependent on external information in order to elaborate policy proposals 
(Balme et al. 2002: 54, Saurugger 2002, 2003: 29). However, the need of expertise varies from policy 
proposal to policy proposal. Some proposals may concern the entire internal market and may be highly 
technical whereas other proposals may only affect a very small sector and only constitute a small 
modification to existing legislation. Thus, the scope and the technicality of legislative proposals 
determine the degree of complexity. The chance of being influential should be particularly high if 
policy proposals are highly complex because in those cases, the European Commission is highly 
dependent on external expertise. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 4:   The higher the complexity of a policy proposal, the higher the chance of an interest  
group to be influential. 
 
Recent work on lobbying in the United States has furthermore identified the size of the lobbying 
perspective  as an important variable affecting interest group influence (Baumgartner et al. 
forthcoming, Leech et al. 2007). A “lobbying perspective” is defined as a group of actors trying to 
achieve the same policy outcome (Baumgartner et al. forthcoming: 13). Thus, the more interest groups 
are located on the same side of the initial policy position of the European Commission, the more likely 
it is that this policy perspective will be influential. It does not matter whether these groups formally 
cooperate by exchanging information or coordinating strategies. As long as they are located on the 
same side of the policy scale, they push the Commission in the same direction and can thus be 
considered as one lobbying team. Hence, one can derive the following hypothesis: 8 
 
Hypothesis 5:   The  higher the number of interest groups  that belong to the same lobbying 
perspective, the higher the chance of an interest group to be influential. 
 
Another important issue variable is the existence and location of the status quo. Status quo is defined 
as the existence of binding general legislation on the European level. The existence of a status quo has 
important implications for the study of interest group influence. The status quo is already the result of 
earlier rounds of policy-making thus constituting a compromise among different stakeholders (see also 
Baumgartner et al. forthcoming: 27). Since the European institutions have already agreed on this 
specific policy position, the Commission anticipates bigger resistance if it moves further away from 
the status quo. Thus, if a status quo already exists, interest groups who are located closer to this status 
quo should find it easier to influence the policy-making process than interest groups located further 
away from the status quo.  
 
Hypothesis 6:   The chance of being influential is higher for interest groups located on the same side 
of the initial Commission position than for groups located on the other side of the 
policy scale.  
 
The theoretical expectations are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
3.  Research Design 
In order to measure interest group influence, the so-called preference attainment approach will be 
employed  (Dür 2008b). Political controversies are modeled spatially and each actor involved can be 
placed on a point of a policy scale to represent the position that it favors. By comparing the policy 
output with the policy preferences of interest groups, one can draw conclusions about the winners and 
losers of the decision-making process. This approach offers several advantages (Dür 2008b): It 
provides an objective measurement of influence, it covers all channels of influence and it can be 
applied to a large number of cases. However, this method also suffers from several problems, namely 
the black-boxing of the processes through which influence is exercised, alternative explanatory factors 
accounting for the coincidence between policy output and preferences and the measurement of 
preferences (Dür 2008b).  
 
While it is an advantage of the preference attainment approach that it covers all paths to influence, it is 
not clear through which of these processes influence is in fact exerted. Even though this black-boxing 9 
 
problem cannot be completely solved, the concentration on one particular phase of the policy-cycle 
could make this problem less severe since fewer actors are involved than in the complete policy-
making process. This paper therefore concentrates on the policy formulation phase and thus interest 
group influence on the policy proposal of the European Commission is analyzed. The European 
Commission has the sole right of initiative in the first pillar so legislative policy-making in this pillar 
always starts with a proposal of the Commission. The elaboration of a proposal is a long process in 
which various stakeholders are consulted. Since the Commission’s proposal is the basis for further 
debate between the Council and the European Parliament, it is more difficult for the other institutions 
to modify than to accept the policy proposal (Thomson/Hosli 2006: 14f). Accordingly, a former 
Secretary General of the European Commission commented that “for interest groups in particular, the 
proposal stage often offers the most fertile opportunities for exerting influence” (Thomson/Hosli 2006: 
15). Hence, the policy formulation stage is of crucial importance to interest groups in order to 
influence the final policy output. 
 
The problem of controlling for alternative explanatory factors refers to the fact that if the policy output 
reflects the interest groups’ policy preferences, it does not necessarily mean that the policy output can 
be attributed to the lobbying activities of a particular interest group. The objectives of interest groups 
and the policy preferences of decision-makers could, for instance, just coincide and an interest group 
was then just lucky (Barry 1980a, 1980b). However, being aware of this limitation, this method can 
still bring us a great deal further in influence measurement: It allows us to determine which interest 
groups were successful in shifting the policy output towards their ideal point. Success then constitutes 
the sum of influence and luck. So even though one might not be able to identify which particular 
interest group caused the policy shift, one can determine the degree of “success” of an interest group 
defined as the probability of getting the policy outputs one wants (Barry 1980b). Furthermore, if the 
analysis of interest group success of a large number of interest groups across a large number of issues 
reveals a systematic pattern, it is plausible to assume that success is not only caused by luck but by 
influence. In the course of this paper, success will be therefore used as a proxy for interest group 
influence. 
 
In order to measure policy positions, quantitative text analysis was used to extract policy positions 
from texts. I used Wordfish, the most recent innovation in quantitative text analysis, since this program 
allows estimating policy positions without any prior knowledge about the texts (Proksch/Slapin 2008, 
Slapin/Proksch 2008). As demonstrated elsewhere (Klüver 2008), this method provides policy position 
estimates which highly correlate with estimates derived from manual hand-coding and estimates 
derived from Wordscores (Laver et al. 2003). However, whereas hand-coding is highly labor intensive 
and suffers from a lack of reliability (Mikhaylov et al. 2008), Wordscores requires reference texts with 10 
 
known policy positions which are so far not available in interest group research. Hence, Wordfish 
provides the best technique to measure interest group preferences on a large empirical scale. Drawing 
on the relative frequency of words and based on the assumption that words are distributed according to 
a Poisson distribution, Wordfish  estimates policy position estimates for texts. The model is the 
following: 
 
yij ~ Poisson (λij) 
λij = exp (αi + ψj + βj * ωi) 
 
yij is the count of word j in text i. α is a set of text effects that control for the length of the documents. ψ 
is a set of word fixed effects that control for the fact that some words, such as articles or prepositions, 
are generally used more frequently than other words. β is an estimate of a word specific weight 
capturing the importance of word j in discriminating between policy positions and ω is the estimate of 
actor i’s policy position. The entire right-hand side of the equation is estimated by an expectation 
maximization (EM) algorithm (for further details see Slapin/Proksch 2008). In order to identify the 
model, α1 and the mean of all policy positions of actors are set to zero and the standard deviation is set 
to one. Confidence intervals for the estimates are obtained drawing on a parametric bootstrap.  
 
In order to measure policy positions of interest groups, their submissions in online consultation of the 
European Commission were analyzed.
8  Online consultations were introduced in 2000 and have 
become a regular instrument of consultation for major policy initiatives (European Commission 2002). 
Between 2000 and October 2008, 535 online consultations were carried out thus providing researchers 
with a fruitful new data source (Quittkat/Finke 2008: 206). Based on a consultation paper, interest 
groups have the opportunity to submit comments for an eight week consultation period before the final 
policy proposal is decided upon.
9
                                                           
8  Being aware that the submissions may reflect “strategic” rather than “true” policy positions (Frieden 2002, 
Thomson/Stokman 2006: 37f), this should not constitute a problem for the analysis since this study focuses on the policy 
positions that in fact have been transmitted to the Commission. Only transmitted policy positions – even if they over- or 
understate the “true” ideal policy positions – are taken into account by the Commission and therefore constitute the basis for 
the influence measurement. 
9 Interest group comments are only published once the deadline for submissions has passed so interest groups are not aware 
of the comments submitted by other actors when submitting their own response. 
 The Commission positions will be extracted from the consultation 
draft and the preamble of the final policy proposal. By comparing the preliminary draft and the final 
policy proposal, one can assess which interest groups were successful in shifting the Commission’s 
position. Using online consultations, it is possible to control for interest group access to the European 
Commission: Only interest groups who actively lobbied on the issue and were able to establish contact 
with the Commission will be analyzed. Being aware that there are other channels for influencing the 
policy proposal, most interest groups trying to influence the proposal should be covered by the 11 
 
analysis since online consultations constitute the easiest form of access. As empirical research 
accordingly shows, a wide variety of actors indeed participates in online consultations, e.g. business 
associations, individual companies and NGOs of international, European, national and sub-national 
origin (Quittkat/Finke 2008).  
 
In order to employ Wordfish, the documents had to be edited before the analysis. The documents used 
for the analysis need to be encyclopedic statements of the actors’ policy positions thus all text 
passages not directly referring to the policy issue in question were removed from the documents.
10 
Before being able to perform quantitative text analysis, all texts had to be transformed in digital format 
thus  optical  character recognition software was used to digitalize scanned documents.
11  Then all 
documents were transformed into text (.txt) files. I furthermore wrote a PHP script in order to 
automate the following modifications necessary for the Wordfish analysis:
12
Since identification in Wordfish is guaranteed by setting the mean of all policy positions to zero and 
the standard deviation to one, the total variance of policy positions is fixed so that absolute distances 
cannot be compared across different issues. Hence, interest group influence cannot be measured by 
simply looking at the change of absolute distances. However, there are three ways to circumvent this 
problem:  First, interest group influence  can  be measured dichotomously by evaluating  if the 
Commission moved towards the ideal points of interest groups. Second, interest group influence can 
be measured dichotomously by assessing whether the distance between policy positions of interest 
groups and the Commission is smaller at t1 than at t0. Third, one could use the relative change of 
distance between the Commission and an interest group from time point t0  to t1  as a metric 
measurement for interest group influence. The influence estimates of these approaches correlate highly 
 Symbols were removed, 
British and American spelling was unified and all words were transformed to lowercase. Then, interest 
group names were removed from each submission and the spelling check of Crimson Editor was used 
to correct mistakes. As Wordfish requires a word frequency matrix as input, the program jfreq was 
used to produce such a matrix. Using jfreq, stop words, numbers and currencies were removed from 
the documents and the words were stemmed (reduced to their root). At last, following the 
recommendation of the Wordfish creators, all stems that were only mentioned in 15 per cent or less of 
the texts per policy issue were removed from the word matrix. 
 
                                                           
10 Such as contact details or information about the interest group in general. Moreover, in semi-standardized consultations 
interest groups sometimes repeat questions posed by the Commission word by word. Thus, without removing these 
repetitions, these texts would automatically score closer to the Commissions’ position than texts not repeating these 
questions. All word-by-word citations were therefore removed from the interest group submissions. 
11  The correct recognition of scanned documents was then checked manually. I thank Max Zalewski for helping me 
converting scanned documents into digital format. 
12 I thank Malte Klüver for assistance in writing the script. 12 
 
at a minimum of 0.82. However, in order to check the robustness of the results, all three measurements 
will be applied in the analysis. 
 
 
In order to examine the effect of the issue-context on interest group influence, this paper analyzes 
interest group influence across several issues. Only policy proposals for directives and regulations 
subject to codecision and consultation will be analyzed in order to focus on general binding legislation 
and to control for the mode of decision-making.
13 I used Prelex to produce a list of all Commission 
proposals for regulations and directives adopted under Codecision and Consultation between 
01.01.2000 and 31.12.2008. Since not every Directorate General (DG) conducted online consultations, 
I only focused on those having used consultations and whose competence concerns a substantial policy 
field (n=19).
14  Between 01.01.2000 and 31.12.2008 these DGs proposed 991 regulations and 
directives subject to Consultation and Codecision. I looked at all these proposals to determine whether 
an online consultation was conducted during its elaboration by drawing on internet research and the 
DemoCiv-database kindly provided by Beate Kohler, Christine Quittkat and Barbara Finke.
15 In total I 
identified 162  consultations which were conducted prior to the adoption of a policy proposal. 
However, not all of these can be used for the analysis: 41 consultations were excluded since they were 
conducted in a standardized format with given questions and answers and thus textual data is not 
available.
16 51 consultations were excluded since the submissions were not published, 6 consultations 
were excluded since the Commission did not release any prior position paper and 4 consultations had 
to be excluded due to other reasons.
17
                                                           
13 The Commission furthermore consults on broad strategies, non-binding legislation and the implementation of legislation 
which is already in force.  
14 Online consultations conducted by the Secretariat General were thus excluded. 
 Thus, 60 issues remain for the analysis. One of the issues, 
REACH, raised an extremely high amount of attention. Around 6000 submissions were received 
during this single online consultation. Since the analysis of this single issue would consume more 
resources than all other 59 issues together and since REACH was already subject of numerous studies 
(e.g. Persson 2007), it was excluded from the analysis. Hence, the overall research project analyzes 
interest group influence on 59 policy proposals. This paper presents first preliminary results stemming 
from the analysis of interest group influence on 15 policy proposals. 
 
15  The DemoCiv  database  was  constructed  by  the research project on “Democratic Legitimacy via Civil Society 
Involvement? The Role of the European Commission” conducted by Beate Kohler, Christine Quittkat and Barbara Finke at 
the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research.  
16  In theory, one could use item-response-theory in order to extract policy positions from submissions in standardized 
consultations. However, since the Commission is  not filling out questionnaires, one  cannot measure the Commission’s 
position. Thus, this research project is limited to the study of open and semi-standardized consultations. 
17 One regulation was excluded since it constitutes a mere recodification of already existing legislation. One directive and one 
regulation were excluded since they only implement an already signed international convention into European law. A fourth 
directive was excluded since the consultation was not based on one single but on six consultation papers. Interest groups 
therefore respond to different subissues based on one, several or all six consultation documents. Thus, it is not possible to 
determine one single policy dimension using quantitative text analysis. 13 
 
Since the European Commission received 5161 submissions from a wide variety of stakeholders, I 
classified all stakeholders that submitted comments into nine groups: membership organizations 
(2719), companies (806), national public authorities (811), researchers (149), individuals (411), 
international public actors (54), third states (57), political parties (8) and others (146). In order to keep 
the workload manageable, I only concentrate on membership organizations, companies and national 
public authorities. Previous studies have shown that membership organizations and companies are the 
most important lobbying actors (e.g. Baumgartner et al. forthcoming, Coen 1998)  and they also 
constitute the biggest groups participating in online consultations.  Comments  by national public 
authorities will be analyzed in order to control for policy positions of Member States. Since Wordfish 
only works with texts in the same language and with a minimum amount of words, non-English 
submissions and submissions with less than 100 words were furthermore excluded.
18
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
 
Information about the nature of the interest and the organizational form of interest groups was 
retrieved from their websites, more specifically from organizational statutes and self-descriptions. 
According to the members and interests they represent, interest groups were classified as cause group 
or sectional group. According to their organizational form they were classified as companies, 
European or  National Associations. Salience was measured by the total number of submissions 
received during the online consultation. The complexity of the policy issue was measured by the 
number of words of the policy proposal excluding the explanatory memorandum. The size of the 
lobbying  perspective  was measured by the number of interest groups left and right of the initial 
Commission position. EurLex as well as information provided in the policy proposal was used in order 
to assess whether a status quo defined as general binding legislation on the EU level already existed. 
Text Analysis of the preamble of the existing legislative act was then used in order to determine the 
location of the status quo. Since absolute distances cannot be compared across different issues, a 
dummy variable is used for the status quo effect: If interest groups were located on the same side of 
the initial policy position of the Commission as the status quo, the status quo variable is coded one. If 
they are located on the other side of the policy scale, the variable is coded zero. 
 
 
 
4.1. Testing the effect of nature of the interest 
First of all, the effect of the nature of the interest on interest group influence will be empirically tested.  
                                                           
18 145 non-English submissions from membership groups, companies and national public actors had to be excluded for the 
fifteen policy issues analyzed so far. 7 texts had to be excluded since they contain less than 100 words. 14 
 
According to the first hypothesis, sectional groups are more influential than cause groups.
19
After having examined the distribution of influence using descriptive statistics, I now examine the 
effect of the nature of the interest using regression analysis. Since lobbying activities of interest groups 
are grouped within issues, the data is of hierarchical nature and hence multilevel modeling would be 
the appropriate technique for analysis. However, since I so far only analyzed 15 issues (11 issues with 
a status quo), the number of second level units is not sufficient for a multilevel analysis and thus I will 
use ordinary logistic and linear OLS regression for now and apply multilevel modeling once all 59 
issue are analyzed.
 Looking at 
the distribution of influence across cause and sectional groups, we find that among all cause and 
sectional groups, influence is distributed in a quite unbalanced way (see table 1): Whereas 73.4 per 
cent of all influential groups are sectional groups, only 26.6 per cent are cause groups. However, if we 
control for the absolute number of groups per group type, this distribution is not that uneven anymore. 
Of all cause groups who participated in the analyzed consultations, 50.0 per cent were influential. In 
comparison, 52.4 per cent of all sectional groups active on these issues were influential. Thus, when 
controlling for the number of groups actually active on the issues, influence is distributed quite 
equally. Accordingly, there is no statistically significant difference between cause groups and sectional 
groups in terms of influence on policy formulation as indicated by the test of significance and the 
correlation coefficient (see notes below table 1). Thus, sectional groups constitute the larger share of 
influential groups since cause groups were simply not as numerous as sectional groups.  
 
20
 
 
  
The regression analysis confirms the findings of the descriptive statistics (see table 2): The nature of 
the interest does not have any statistically significant effect on interest group influence. This finding is 
constant across all twelve models estimated in the analysis. No matter which influence measurement is 
used and no matter whether a simple bivariate analysis is performed or a multivariate analysis 
controlling for issue related variables is estimated, the nature of the interest does not have any 
significant effect on interest group influence. The overall model fit of the bivariate models (model 1, 3, 
5, 7, 9 and 11) is accordingly zero across all six models. Hence, one can conclude that contrary to 
hypothesis one, sectional groups are not more influential than cause groups. Nature of the interest does 
not have any effect on interest group influence. 
 
 
                                                           
19 Due to illustration purposes, descriptive statistics will only be presented for the first influence measurement, namely the 
assessment  whether the Commission moved into the direction  of an actor’s ideal point. The two further influence 
measurements will however be presented in the regression analysis. 
20 The exact minimum number of second level units is still discussed in the literature, however a minimum of 30 second level 
units is widely acknowledged (for a discussion, see Maas/Hox 2004). 15 
 
4.2. Testing the effect of organizational form 
According to hypothesis two, companies should be more influential than European interest groups 
whereas the latter should be more influential than national interest groups. Of all influential companies 
and European as well as National Associations, 26.6 per cent constitute individual companies, 39.1 per 
cent constitute European Associations and 34.3 per cent constitute National Associations (see table 3). 
Looking at the share of influential groups per organizational format, 51.6 per cent of all companies, 
57.6 per cent of all European Associations and 48.9 per cent of all National Associations were 
influential.  Hence, just by looking at the distribution of influence using descriptive statistics, it 
becomes clear that companies are not the most influential interest groups when compared to European 
and National Associations.  By contrast, European Associations constitute the largest share of all 
influential groups, no matter whether measured in total or whether controlled for number of groups per 
organizational form. The correlation of organizational form and interest group influence is close to 
zero and  accordingly  there is no statistically significant effect  (see notes below table 3). Just by 
looking at simple cross-tabs and descriptive statistics, one can thus already reject hypothesis two.  
 
These preliminary findings will now be tested using logistic and linear OLS regression analysis (see 
table 4). None of the bivariate models displays a statistically significant effect of organizational form 
on interest group influence. No matter which influence measurement is used, the effect remains 
insignificant. However, when controlling for issue related variables, the models drawing on a 
dichotomous measurement of influence (model 14, 16, 18, 20 and 22) contain a significant effect for 
one of the dummy variables used to measure the effect of organizational form. However, these effects 
are not robust: Whereas the direction of the effect of being a National Association as compared to 
companies is always negative, this effect is only significant in model 16 and 20. Thus, there is only a 
statistically significant effect when controlling for issue-related variables and when limiting the 
analysis to issues for which a status quo existed. Moreover, the significance of this effect is not 
confirmed when using the metric influence measurement. Concerning the effect of being a European 
Association as compared to companies, the findings are even more inconclusive: In contrast to 
hypothesis  two, the effect is positive in eleven  of the twelve  models, only model 19 displays a 
negative effect as predicted. In addition, the effect of organizational form is only significant in model 
14, 18 and 22. The lack of explanatory power of organizational form is confirmed by the overall 
model fit of the bivariate models: The Pseudo R² and Adjusted R² respectively range from 0.00 to 
0.01. Thus, one can conclude that contrary to hypothesis two, organizational form cannot account for 
variation in interest group influence. 
 
 
 16 
 
4.3. Testing the effect of issue related variables 
According to hypothesis three, salience has a negative effect on interest group influence. It was 
assumed that the higher the salience of a policy issue, the lower the chances of an interest group to be 
influential. The empirical analysis however reveals no robust effect of salience on interest group 
influence (see table 5, but also table 3 and table 4). The effect of salience on interest group influence is 
only significant in two out of eighteen models which control for issue-related variables (model 24 and 
model 30). However, not only the significance of the effect of issue salience is inconsistent, also the 
direction of the effect does not remain stable. Out of the eighteen models controlling for issue-related 
variables, seven display a negative effect whereas eleven models indicate a positive effect. In addition, 
the size of the effect is extremely small. Hence, contrary to hypothesis three, salience does not have a 
robust effect on interest group influence.  
 
Hypothesis four suggested a positive relationship between the complexity of policy proposals and 
interest group influence. In fact, sixteen of the eighteen models controlling for issue-variables display 
a significant effect of complexity on interest group influence. However, in contrast to hypothesis four, 
complexity has a negative effect on interest group influence across all the eighteen models. Thus, 
based on the preliminary analysis of fifteen policy issues interest groups are less influential on more 
complex issues and hypothesis four  therefore needs to be rejected. Since this effect is however 
extremely small, it is quite likely that this effect does not remain stable when analyzing more policy 
issues. Hence, further investigation is needed for the effect of complexity on interest group influence. 
 
According to hypothesis five, the size of the lobbying perspective is positively correlated with interest 
group influence. Hence, it was assumed that the chance of being influential increases with the number 
of interest groups located on the same side of the initial Commission position. The empirical analysis 
confirms this hypothesized relationship: Across all eighteen  models the size of the lobbying 
perspective has a highly significant positive effect on interest group influence. Thus, the higher the 
number of interest groups belonging to the same lobbying perspective, the higher the chance of being 
influential. 
 
Hypothesis six suggested that the chance of being influential is higher when interest groups are located 
on the same side of the initial Commission position as the status quo. This hypothesis is validated by 
the multivariate analysis: Across all nine models which control for the location of the status quo, there 
is a significant and highly positive effect of being located on the same side as the status quo on interest 
group influence. Hence, interest groups who happen to be on the same side of the policy continuum as 
the status quo are likely to be more influential than interest groups positioned on the other side of the 
policy scale. Drawing on the two dichotomous influence measurement, the odds ratio range from 2.42 17 
 
(model 8) to 5.29 (model 26). Thus, the chance of being influential is at least 2.42 times higher for 
interest groups being located on the same side of the policy scale as the status quo than for interest 
groups positioned on the other side. 
 
When comparing the overall model fit of models only including interest group type with models 
controlling for issue characteristics, it becomes clear that issue characteristics are highly superior in 
explaining variation in interest group influence: The average Pseudo R² is 0.27 and the average 
Adjusted R² is 0.23 for models controlling for issue characteristics whereas the average Pseudo R² as 
well as the average Adjusted R² is zero for models only controlling for interest group type. Hence, 
whereas issue characteristics dispose of a high explanatory power, the nature of the interest as well as 
organizational form does not account for variation in interest group influence. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The explanation of policy outcomes as well as the democratic legitimacy of the EU crucially depends 
on how much influence interest groups have and how influence is distributed among them. However, 
only few studies have addressed the question of influence and most were limited to case studies 
focusing only on one single issue. These studies are however characterized by contradictory findings 
and thus this paper attempted to provide solid empirical evidence in order to test existing hypotheses 
on a large empirical basis. The present version of the paper presented preliminary results on fifteen 
policy issues stemming from a larger project. After completion of the entire data collection, the 
analysis will be extended to fifty-nine issues and approximately 3525 observations.  
 
Based on the literature on interest group influence, it was hypothesized that interest group influence is 
shaped by two groups of variables: On the one hand, interest group influence was assumed to vary 
according to interest group type. More specifically, two dimensions of interest group type were 
hypothesized to have an effect on interest group influence: The most prominent hypothesis is that 
interest group influence varies according to the nature of the interest (e.g. Dür/de Bièvre 2007a, 
Persson 2007, Schneider/Baltz 2003). Cause groups should find it more difficult to influence policy 
outcomes than sectional groups since they are less well endowed with resources. Pieter Bouwen (2002, 
2004) by contrast hypothesized that the organizational form plays a crucial role for being able to 
influence the decision-making process. According to Bouwen (2002, 2004), companies are more 
powerful than European and National Associations in influencing the policy-making process since 
they are better able to provide access goods to decision-makers. On the other hand, scholars have 
recently pointed out the importance of issue related factors for interest group influence (e.g. 18 
 
Baumgartner et al. forthcoming, Mahoney 2007, 2008). According to the characteristics of the policy 
issue at hand, interest groups influence is assumed to vary across issues. However, since most of the 
few studies on interest group influence in the EU actually concentrate on one or just a few policy 
issues, the effect of issue related variables could not be empirically tested since the issue context is 
held constant (for an exception, see Mahoney 2008). 
 
The lack of large-N studies controling for issue variables is mainly due to methodological difficulties 
in measuring influence. Hence, this paper employed a new approach: Drawing on a quantitative text 
analysis performed with Wordfish, policy preferences of interest groups were  compared with the 
policy proposal in order to identify the winners and the losers of the decision-making process. While 
controling for interest group type, the effect of issue-related variables on interest group influence was 
tested across fifteen policy issues. 
 
The preliminary results show no evidence for a significant effect of interest group type on interest 
group influence. Neither nature of the interest nor organizational form had a consistent effect on 
interest group influence. Hence, based on this preliminary analysis, two existing hypotheses in interest 
group research need to be rejected. By contrast, issue  characteristics explained a high share of 
variation in interest group influence: Being located on the same side of the initial Commission position 
as the status quo had a significant and strong positive effect on interest group influence. The size of 
the lobbying perspective understood as the number of interest groups located on the same side of the 
initial Commission position also had a significant and positive effect on interest group influence. 
Whereas the significance and direction of these two effects remain robust over a plurality of different 
models, the effects of salience and complexity of the policy proposal are inconclusive. Salience and 
complexity only have a very small effect which is not significant across all models. The direction of 
the salience effect even varies across the models.  Hence, whereas the size of the lobbying perspective 
and being located on the same policy side as the status quo have a strong and robust effect, salience 
and complexity of the policy proposal need to be further investigated. However, it can already be 
concluded from this preliminary analysis that issue characteristics have a high explanatory power 
whereas interest group type cannot account for variation in interest group influence. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Influence of Cause Groups vs. Sectional Groups 
Group type 
Influential groups  Total number of 
groups (n=524)  % of all influential 
groups  % of group type  number of influential 
groups (n=271) 
Cause  
Groups 
 
26.6  50.0  72  144 
Sectional 
Groups 
 
73.4  52.4  199  380 
Notes: Pearson Chi2(1) = 0.2346, p = 0.628, Cramer’s V = 0.0212 
 
 
 
Table 3: Influence according to organizational form 
Organizational form 
Influential groups 
Total number of 
groups (n=592)  % of all influential 
groups 
% of 
organizational 
form 
Number of 
influential groups 
(n=312) 
Companies 
  26.6  51.6  83  161 
European Associations 
  39.1  57.6  122  212 
National Associations 
  34.3  48.9  107  219 
Notes: Pearson Chi2(2) = 3.3798, p = 0.185, Cramer’s V = 0.0756 
 
Influence 
 
- Nature of the interest 
- Organizational form 
- Salience 
- Complexity  
- Size of lobbying perspective 
- Location of Status Quo 
  
Issue level 
Interest group level 
Figure 1: Theoretical model 23 
 
Table 2: Effect of nature of the interest with and without controling for issue variables- Results from logistic and linear OLS regression 
  Influence = Commission moved towards actor’s ideal 
point (dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission decreased 
(dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission decreased 
(metric) 
Variables  All issues  Only issues with SQ  All issues  Only issues with SQ  All issues  Only issues with SQ 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
Interest group level 
 
                       
Sectional group 
(ref: cause groups) 
1.10 
(0.22) 
1.02 
(0.23) 
1.44 
(0.33) 
 
1.09 
(0.31) 
1.01 
(0.20) 
0.86 
(0.20) 
1.26 
(0.29) 
0.98 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Issue level 
 
                       
Salience    0.99 
(0.00) 
   0.99 
(0.00) 
 
  0.99 
(0.00) 
  0.99 
(0.00) 
  -0.00 
(0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
Complexity    0.99*** 
(0.00) 
  0.99* 
(0.00) 
 
  0.99*** 
(0.00) 
  0.99** 
(0.00) 
  -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.00* 
(0.00) 
Size of lobbying 
perspective 
  1.06*** 
(0.01) 
  1.06*** 
(0.01) 
 
  1.06*** 
(0.01) 
  1.06*** 
(0.27) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Located on same 
side as Status Quo 
      4.79*** 
(1.27) 
 
      2.42** 
(0.64) 
      0.16* 
(0.06) 
N  524  524  419  419  524  524  419  419  524  524  419  419 
Prob>chi² / Prob>F  0.63  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.97  0.00  0.32  0.00  0.88  0.00  0.39  0.00 
Pseudo R² / Adj. R²  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.29  0.00  0.26  0.00  0.28  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.22 
Notes: Regression coefficients of the logistic regressions (model 1 – 8) are indicated as odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at the p<0.05 level, ** significant at the p<0.01 level, 
*** significant at the p<0.001 level.  
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Table 4: Effect of organizational form with and without controling for issue variables - Results from logistic and linear OLS regression 
  Influence = Commission moved towards actor’s 
ideal point (dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission decreased 
(dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission decreased 
(metric) 
  All issues  Only issues with SQ  All issues  Only issues with SQ  All issues  Only issues with SQ 
  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model 22  Model 23  Model 24 
Interest group level 
 
                       
European 
Associations 
(ref: companies) 
1.27 
(0.27) 
1.91* 
(0.48) 
 
1.07 
(0.25) 
1.41 
(0.43) 
 
1.22 
(0.26) 
1.86* 
(0.47) 
0.87 
(0.21) 
1.13 
(0.34) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.07) 
National 
Associations 
(ref: companies) 
0.90 
(0.19) 
0.96 
(0.24) 
  0.70 
(0.17) 
0.52* 
(0.16) 
 
0.88 
(0.19) 
0.96 
(0.25) 
0.63 
(0.15) 
0.50* 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
 
Issue level 
 
                       
Salience    1.00 
(0.00) 
  1.00 
(0.00) 
 
  0.99 
(0.00) 
  1.00 
(0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
  0.00* 
(0.00) 
Complexity    0.99*** 
(0.00) 
  0.99 
(0.00) 
 
  0.99*** 
(0.00) 
  0.99** 
(0.00) 
  -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
  -0.00 
(0.00) 
Size of lobbying 
perspective 
  1.05*** 
(0.01) 
  1.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
  1.06*** 
(0.01) 
  1.05*** 
(0.01) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Located on same 
side as Status Quo 
      4.82*** 
(1.22) 
 
      2.91*** 
(0.72) 
      0.24*** 
(0.06) 
N  592  592  462  462  592  592  462  462  592  592  462  462 
Prob>chi² / Prob>F  0.18  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.13  0.00 
Pseudo R² / Adj. R²  0.00  0.23  0.01  0.32  0.00  0.26  0.01  0.29  0.00  0.21  0.00  0.26 
Notes: Regression coefficients of the logistic regressions (model 13 - 20) are indicated as odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at the p<0.05 level, ** significant at the p<0.01 
level, *** significant at the p<0.001 level.  
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Table 5: Effect of issue level characteristics - Results from logistic and linear OLS regression 
  Influence = Commission moved towards 
actor’s ideal point (dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission 
decreased (dichotomous) 
Influence = Distance to Commission 
decreased (metric) 
Variables  Model 25  Model 26  Model 27  Model 28  Model 29  Model 30 
 
Salience 
 
 
0.99 
(0.00) 
 
 
1.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.99 
(0.00) 
 
1.00 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
Complexity  0.99*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.99** 
(0.00) 
0.99*** 
(0.00) 
0.99*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00* 
(0.00) 
Size of lobbying perspective  1.06*** 
(0.01) 
 
1.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.06*** 
(0.01) 
1.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Located on same side  
as Status Quo 
  5.30*** 
(1.24) 
 
  2.83*** 
(0.65) 
  0.24*** 
(0.06) 
N  685  544  685  544  685  544 
Prob>chi² / Prob>F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R² / Adj. R²  0.24  0.33  0.27  0.29  0.21  0.25 
Notes: Regression coefficients of the logistic regressions (model 25 – 28) are indicated as odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at the p<0.05 level, ** significant at the  
p<0.01 level, *** significant at the p<0.001 level.  
 
 
 